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Abstract 
Almost since its inception, the dominant narrative of modern psychology has embraced 
positivism through its insistence that psychological science is objective, generalisable, 
and value free (or neutral). Consequently, quantitative research and in particular, 
experimental designs, are privileged over other forms of enquiry and other 
epistemologies, methodologies, and methods remain marginalised within the discipline. 
Alternative epistemologies and methodologies remain predominantly at the margins 
within psychological research yet have resulted from the growing dissatisfaction with 
the dominance of positivism. We argue that the enduring hegemony of positivism needs 
to be opposed to enable psychology to genuinely understand the antecedents of, and 
provides meaningful sustainable solutions for, complex human issues without being 
constrained by a narrow focus on method. We discuss how psychology in Australia can 
move towards embracing methodological and epistemological pluralism and provide a 
number of suggestions for change across the interrelated areas of accreditation, 
curriculum, the Australian Psychological Society, and research. 
 
Word count: 151 
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Psychology and the Research Enterprise: Moving Beyond the Enduring Dominance of 
Positivism 
Almost since its inception, the dominant narrative of modern psychology has 
embraced the positivist orientation of the natural sciences and has been slow to adopt 
alternative epistemological and methodological approaches. Several parallel features of 
the current climate combine for a timely (re)examination of the research endevour 
within Australian psychology. First, psychology courses are accredited by the 
Australian Psychology Accreditation Council (APAC) in order to ensure greater 
uniformity of registration for the practise of psychology (Littlefield, Giese, & 
Katsikidis, in association with members of APAC, 2007). Second, the Excellence in 
Research for Australia (ERA) initiative (formerly the Research Quality Framework 
[RQF]) provides a metric-based system for assessing the demonstrable quality and 
impact of Australian research. In addition, the Council of Australian Governments’ 
[COAG] (2006) twin decisions to allow clients of psychologists to access Medicare 
rebates as well as providing funded postgraduate places in clinical psychology, in order 
to improve Australia’s mental health. These recent developments provide a clear link 
between research, curriculum, and evidence-based practice within psychology in 
Australia. However, questions remain as to the definition of quality science and 
scholarship and what constitutes legitimate knowledge and evidence. 
In this paper we outline a case for why psychology needs to forgo the 
dominance of the epistemology of positivism1 and provide suggestions for how this may 
be achieved. First, an overview of the history of positivism and the antecedents of its 
relationship with psychology is presented. Second, the evolution of the relationship 
between psychology and positivism is outlined. Third, we discuss the hegemonic role of 
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positivism in contemporary psychology, and in particular, we emphasise the Australian 
context. Next, we argue why Australian psychology needs to embrace epistemological 
and methodological pluralism and conclude with suggestions for change across the 
interrelated areas of accreditation, curriculum, the Australian Psychological Society, and 
research. 
The Epistemology of Positivism: An Overview and History2 
The epistemology of positivism asserts that knowledge is objective and value-
free (or neutral) and is obtained through the application of the scientific method. The 
aims of positivism are description, prediction, control, and explanation and the 
overarching goal of positivism is the production of universal laws (Leahey, 1992). The 
central research methodology of positivistic research is the experiment. Utilising 
Popper’s (1934/1959) notion of falsification, positivism yielded a hypothetico-deductive 
approach to understanding the world, whereby some variables are operationally defined, 
others are controlled, still others are manipulated, and predictions are clearly stated on 
an a priori basis (Patton, 2002), enabling cause and effect relationships to be identified. 
The reliability and validity of the data are then determined by the replication of the 
experiment and the generalisability of the findings. The fixation on quantifying 
psychological phenomena occurred so that the research could be considered objective 
and ‘true’, in accordance with the tradition of Western science (Mitchell, 2003). 
The foundational theorist of positivism was Auguste Comte3 who in 1848 
founded the Société Positiviste (Crotty, 1998). He believed that all sciences required a 
universal method of inquiry. This unifying method of inquiry became known as the 
scientific method, and its features were shared across varied disciplines including 
mathematics, physics, sociology, biology, and psychology. Despite Comte’s suspicion 
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of mass quantification and ‘blind’ objectivism (Crotty, 1998), experimental designs and 
the search for universal truth irrespective of the broader context became synonymous 
with positivism. 
In the early decades of the 20th century, the Vienna Circle, consisting of 
philosophers, mathematicians, physicists, and logicians, advanced the philosophy of 
logical positivism, which resulted from the marriage of empiricism and formal logic 
(Leahey, 1992). An important outcome of the Vienna Circle was the verification 
principle. In logical positivist terms, verified knowledge becomes factual. Spirituality, 
religion, ethics, opinions, beliefs, assumptions, and feelings (i.e., the unverifiable) had 
no role in the scientific endeavour. These were considered nonsensical in the search for 
the accurate and certain truth. As a result of Nazism, the Circle disbanded before World 
War II as members sought retreat abroad, which aided the spread of logical positivism 
around the globe. As a result, logical positivism dominated the research endeavour in 
many disciplines throughout the 20th century, including psychology. 
Positivism and Psychology: Evolution of the Alliance 
In the dominant narrative of modern psychology, Wilhelm Wundt is regarded as 
the founder of psychology as a discipline (Greenwood, 2003). In 1879 he established 
the first psychological research laboratory in Leipzig, Germany. Trained in physiology, 
Wundt applied the research methods of physiology to the study of consciousness, 
including the systematic manipulation and control of variables. However, Wundt’s use 
of the term ‘experiment’ was considerably broader in definition than contemporary 
scientific usage. Among his research methods was introspection, a technique used to 
elicit subjective phenomenological data, but this was criticised for lacking scientific 
rigor. Wundt acknowledged the limitations of applying his experimental methods to 
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social phenomena such as norms, culture, and social structure (Greenwood, 2003; 
Toulmin & Leary, 1985), and despite Wundt’s assertion that eclectic methods should be 
used to study human phenomena, the experiment soon became the dominant research 
methodology within psychology. 
The appropriation and application of the epistemology and methodologies of the 
natural sciences to social and psychological phenomena occurred to position 
psychology as a scientific, and therefore legitimate, discipline (Gergen, 1985; Leahey, 
1992; Rosenau, 1992).The uncritical and unquestioning adherence to empiricism and 
the corresponding disinterest in the philosophy of science has been labelled, “the cult of 
empiricism” (Toulmin & Leary, 1985, p. 594). Logical positivism and radical 
empiricism led the way for the rise of behaviourism, which is generally considered to be 
psychology’s dominant theoretical position during the early 20th century. As a result of 
the alliance, mainstream psychology adopted a hypothetico-deductive approach to 
investigation. 
Although debates concerning these developments within psychology were rare, 
particularly in the United States (Toulmin & Leary, 1985), Sanford (1903) described the 
application of methods from physics to psychology as a “dumb compulsion” (p. 106). 
Still, the influence was immense; Watson (1913/1994) described the behaviourist view 
of psychology as “a purely objective experimental branch of natural science” (p. 248). 
In addition, the language of research became rather mechanistic (Toulmin & Leary, 
1985). For example, behaviourist researchers began to refer to their participants as 
reagents (Rosnow, 1981)4. The focus converged on phenomena that could be directly 
observed (i.e., behaviour), despite the natural sciences routinely studying unobservable 
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phenomena such as energy (Gergen, 1985). Consequently, mental phenomena such as 
consciousness, memory and so on were deemed inappropriate for psychological study. 
In the latter half of the 20th century, the notion that mental phenomena could be 
inferred by observable phenomena via the use of operational definitions (Gergen, 1985; 
Leahey, 1992) gained ascendancy and led to the development of cognitive psychology 
and its associated information-processing paradigm (Newell, 1985). Gleitman (1985) 
cynically stated that cognitive processes became legitimate phenomena for 
psychological study when they were established in rats. Rather than using Wundt’s 
introspection methodology, research into cognitive processes occurred via the use of 
rigorous experimental methods. Despite cognitive psychology’s promise to move 
towards expanding the domains considered appropriate for psychological study, 
positivism and experimental methodology remained dominant. 
Although an area of research long before the middle of the 20th century, social 
psychology emerged as a specific discipline in the 1950s and 1960s. It was thought that 
social psychology, the branch of the psychology with a specific emphasis on social 
issues, would equip psychologists with answers to social problems. Despite this aim, the 
dominant epistemology in social psychology remained positivistic in nature (Gergen, 
1985). In fact, experimental methods are so central to social psychology that the sub-
discipline is often referred to as experimental social psychology (Gergen, 1978; Stam, 
Radke, & Lubek, 2000). 
Rosnow (1981) wrote of the crisis in social psychology, consisting of the 
artefact crisis, the ethics crisis, and the relevance crisis. The artefact crisis describes the 
notion that the limitations inherent in experimental methods are a function of the 
methods themselves. The artefact could be separated into two types – experimenter 
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effects (e.g., the placebo effect, unconscious suggestion by the researcher, errors in 
recording observations, self-fulfilling prophecies, ‘biases’ in data interpretation, 
intentional ‘distortion’ of findings, and experimental environment) and participant 
effects (e.g., participants’ expectations, demand characteristics). He argued that these 
effects are not minor nuisances but are issues that seriously affect the research process 
and consequently, the research outcome. Social psychologists attempted to overcome 
the artefact crisis by engaging in deception, which was elevated to an art form5 (e.g., 
Asch, 1951; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Milgram, 1963).  
The ethics crisis grew out of concern for the physical and psychological safety 
of the participants in these studies, as well as the potential for distrust of researchers and 
the discipline as a whole (Rosnow, 1981). Psychological research and practice with an 
applied focus and/or multiple levels of analysis are not readily addressed by ethical 
codes (O’Neill, 1989). In addition, codes of ethics have been criticised for being 
reactive rather than proactive – they are altered only after issues and problems with 
them are identified – and for serving the interests of researchers rather than the 
researched (Prilleltensky, 1997). Finally, researchers might strictly adhere to an ethical 
code but the research may still be exploitative (see Fielder, Roberts, & Abdullah, 2000; 
Hall, 1997; Smith, 1999). 
Rosnow’s (1981) third criticism is the relevance crisis. By the 1960s, doubts 
surfaced as to the ability of psychological research to contribute to an understanding and 
amelioration of social ills. In his presidential address to the American Psychological 
Association, Miller (1969) implored psychologists to become more relevant to social 
issues and human welfare. Criticisms were levelled at the pervasive and nearly 
ubiquitous use of experiments and at participant samples, which almost invariably 
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consisted of undergraduate psychology students (Cook, 1985; Toulmin & Leary, 1985). 
Jahoda (1981) argued that “hypothetical relations between precisely defined concepts 
from which predictions can be deduced” (1981, p. 186), are not suitable for application 
to complex human phenomena and Scherer (1992) was critical of research where; 
…subtle and methodologically fancy manipulations of minor variables in 
relatively artificial settings or pretty path analyses of large but superficial 
data sets may delight colleagues and rigorous journal editors but will find 
little attention elsewhere. (p. 11) 
Today, commentators continue to point to the absence of the ‘social’ in contemporary 
social psychology (e.g., Greenwood, 2004; Stam, 2006). Despite claims that the crisis in 
social psychology is “over” (e.g., Aronson, 1998, p. 2), Stam (2006) argued that the 
criticisms central to the crisis were simply ignored. 
Positivism and Psychology Today: The Maintenance of the Hegemony 
Within contemporary psychology, positivism remains in a privileged position. 
Even a conservative reading of postmodernist perspectives to psychology would present 
an immense scholarly challenge to the hegemony within the discipline and would be 
distressing (Rosenau, 1992). Lather (1991) argued that positivism is fortified by the 
“self-designated guardians of orthodoxy” (p. xvi) who maintain the hegemony of this 
epistemology while alternatives are devalued or dismissed. A simple perusal of 
psychology textbooks or a search of websites of Australian schools and departments of 
psychology highlights a distinct bias towards positivism within the curriculum as 
evidenced by the focus on the experimental and quasi-experimental methods and 
teaching of statistical analysis techniques for the analysis of quantitative data.  
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Supplementing the bias towards positivism is the focus of the textbooks and 
curriculum which acts to celebrate, romanticise, and mythologise the positivist history 
of the discipline. For example, Harris (1997) examined the original reports of classic 
psychological studies and compared the reports with the ways in which those studies are 
typically represented. According to most psychological textbooks, Watson and Raynor 
(1920) easily created a rat phobia in Little Albert, and his fear readily generalised to all 
things ‘fluffy’ and/or white. Yet according to the original paper, Little Albert’s fear was 
difficult to produce, temporary, and was not linked to the colour or texture of objects. 
Asch’s (1951) study had anti-Fascist implications in terms of investigating the 
circumstances in which people do not conform to the majority rather that when they do. 
However, the study was ‘rewritten’ over time because Asch’s communist and Leftist 
leanings rendered the paper highly political. Harris (1997) concluded that reframing the 
research aims and findings promoted the relatively new field of psychology as 
experimental, empirical, conceptually rigorous, and apolitical, which all served to 
enhance the ascendancy of the positivist epistemology. 
This hegemony of positivism is sustained by the accreditation requirements 
established by the Australian Psychological Society (APS), and more recently, the 
national accreditation body, APAC. APAC’s (2008) Rules for accreditation & 
Accreditation standards for psychology courses describe the various graduate attributes 
(see section 3.1.7) that need to be incorporated into the undergraduate degree. The 
second of these graduate attributes is devoted to psychological research and refers to the 
“characteristics of the science of psychology”, “the research methods used by 
psychologists”, and the ability to “formulate testable hypotheses [and] operationalise 
variables”, conduct “a range of practical laboratory experiments”, and “make valid and 
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reliable measurements” (APAC, 2008, pp. 10-11). The language reinforces the 
dominance of the positivist position to the marginalisation, if not exclusion, of other 
forms of enquiry that are also rigorous and perhaps have a greater potential for applied 
impact. 
The specific positions, methodologies, and analyses that students should be 
introduced to are not specified in the Accreditation Standards, and as Sullivan (2008) 
commented, “it is possible that many Australian departments argue that the history and 
philosophy of psychology have been introduced and examined as part of each unit or 
that advanced theoretical electives address this requirement” (p. 66, italics in original). 
However, his analysis demonstrated that 11 schools and departments of psychology in 
Australia have no units with substantial theoretical content and where it does exist, it is 
usually limited and lacking depth, and therefore students are unable to identify the 
hidden assumptions that provide the foundation to their professional practice. Attention 
to theoretical questions within psychology is often regarded as being “flaky”, “vague”, 
“controversial”, “difficult”, “unnecessary”, “too political”, and akin to “navel gazing” 
(Sullivan, 2008, pp. 7-9);  We need to move beyond these myths that act as distinct 
barriers to methodological and epistemological pluralism within the discipline. 
Additionally, COAG’s (2006) reforms to mental health services have resulted in 
a two-tiered system whereby all registered psychologists can provide general 
psychological services but where specialist level service provision, and access to a 
higher level of Medicare rebate funding, is reserved solely for clinical psychological 
services (Littlefield, 2006). A parallel decision saw the establishment of an additional 
200 funded places in clinical psychology while other postgraduate psychology training 
programmes did not receive the same consideration. Although the funding model was 
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later adjusted to enable seven of the remaining eight psychology specialisations access 
to the higher level of cluster funding6 (Littlefield, 2007), one might argue that the 
damage had been done. The “discriminatory” and “inequitable” (Littlefield, 2007, p. 6) 
decisions have unforeseen (though not unforeseeable) consequences7 resulting in the 
narrowing of postgraduate training opportunities for students and the consequential 
narrowing or the focus and orientation of the discipline as a whole. Privileging one form 
of psychology, especially one that adheres to the dominant scientist-practitioner model 
with its accompanying positivist frameworks, reinforces the dominance of this 
philosophical orientation and marginalises alternate, but equally legitimate 
epistemological and methodological perspectives. The result of these changes are 
already becoming apparent with the Chair of the APS College of Sports Psychologists 
recently stating that the College, and the specialist postgraduate courses it approves, are 
both “under threat” (Ievleva, 2008, p. 19). It is highly likely that some of the other 
Colleges and specialist courses are facing the same tensions.  
Initiatives such as the Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) scheme 
indicate that numerical ratings systems, such as journal impact factor and the quantity of 
citations, are now of utmost importance in assessing the impact and quality of research. 
These systems are viewed as easy-to-use and ‘objective’ and as such, are rapidly 
gaining influence (Cheek, Garnham, & Quan, 2006). As a result, researchers working 
within emerging fields or from non-traditional epistemologies  and methodologies may 
experience greater difficulties in promoting the quality of their research, gaining 
competitive funding, and achieving promotion, which further marginalises already 
marginalised research(ers) and further strengthens the status quo (Cheek et al., 2006; 
Rappaport, 2005). Indeed, research is becoming increasingly an entrepreneurial activity 
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whereby researchers within the psy-complex are ‘rewarded’ for maintaining the 
prevailing state of affairs (Parker, 1999; Rose, 1996). Importantly, the ERA initiative is 
designed to prevent any advantage of one discipline or study area over others (Carr, 
2008; Universities Australia, 2008), but the extent to which it will be successful in 
achieving equity remains to be seen. 
Within Australia and elsewhere, much of the attention to concerns such as 
epistemological dominance, the promotion of social justice, and challenging and 
changing the status quo, occurs under the umbrella of critical psychology (Austin & 
Prilleltensky, 2001; Riggs, 2004), yet these concerns remain marginalised with 
Australia (Sullivan, 2008). This is likely to be because Australian psychology and its 
various sub-disciplines have largely taken their lead from influences elsewhere, 
particularly North America8 (Cooke, 2000; Garton, 2006; O’Neil, 1987). As a result, the 
discipline underplays the philosophy of science and theoretical concerns, focuses almost 
exclusively on the scientist-practitioner model, and is dominated by experimental 
approaches and clinical and social psychology (Cooke, 2000; Gridley, Fisher, Thomas, 
& Bishop, 2007, Lipp et al., 2006; Taft & Day, 1988). 
A Way Forward: Embracing Epistemological and Methodological Pluralism  
Several commentators (e.g., Cook, 1985; Gergen, 1999; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; 
McGuire, 1983; Riggs, 2004; Rosnow, 1981) have argued for methodological, 
theoretical, and epistemological pluralism that more readily capture the complexities 
and contexts of psychological phenomena. Sheehan (1996) summarised three concerns 
outlined by the Australian Research Council, the premier research funding body in 
Australia that serve to emphasise the narrow focus of psychology. The Council stated 
that Australian psychology is monocultural, avoids epistemological and ethical 
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concerns, and has not reached its potential concerning its applied relevance to social 
issues. These concerns have been recently highlighted by Riggs (2004) and Ranzijn, 
McConnochie, Day, Nolan, and Wharton (2008). The dominance of positivism has the 
potential to reinforce the position that psychology offers little relevance to the 
understanding or solution of complex social issues. This shift towards pluralism need 
not negate or compromise the systematic pursuit of knowledge. Indeed, we do not reject 
the experimental method per se; rather, we acknowledge that a particular type of 
research question might be best answered by one approach over another. However, the 
problem lies in the uncritical acceptance of one epistemology, methodology, or method 
over all others. 
Achieving epistemological and methodological pluralism requires holistic and 
complex changes within psychological training, practice, and research. We need to 
recognise that the necessary processes of change require multiple strategies at multiple 
levels. The implementation of these strategies will require working partnerships 
between research psychologists, practicing psychologists, APS, APAC, schools and 
departments of psychology, funding bodies, and employer groups. Achieving 
methodological and epistemological pluralism is likely to spark controversy, be met 
with resistance, and will take time. In order to move beyond the dominance of 
positivism, we provide a number of suggestions for change across the interrelated areas 
of APAC accreditation and curriculum, the APS, and research. 
The processes and standards on which accreditation of schools and departments 
of psychology currently exist need to be applied more flexibly. The language of the 
Accreditation Standards is not explicitly exclusionary but in practice they are 
interpreted narrowly. In addition to the writing of APAC’s (2008) Rules for 
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accreditation & Accreditation standards for psychology courses, the frame of reference 
for the application of them is likely to be positivist and as a result they are likely to be 
interpreted and applied narrowly. As a result, APAC’s Rules for accreditation & 
Accreditation standards for psychology courses require revision so that the 
methodologies and epistemologies of the research endeavour are positioned as equally 
legitimate and systematic. If conducted appropriately, all methodologies allow 
interpretation, explanation, and prediction from the data. We need to acknowledge that 
that methodologies and methods differ in their epistemological, ontological, rhetorical, 
and axiological assumptions (Creswell, 1998) and that all have their own strengths and 
limitations. 
Further, the histories and philosophies of psychology and the research traditions 
that emerged as a function of psychology’s adherence to positivism should feature 
clearly and explicitly in the foundational undergraduate curriculum. It is important first 
to understand how psychology as a discipline developed and how its emergence at a 
specific historical time situated it in a particular contextual space that resulted in the 
discipline developing in the manner it did and the consequences of its development. The 
focus on research methods needs to be replaced with an emphasis on the entire research 
framework that articulates the pathway from epistemology to theoretical position to 
methodology to method (Crotty, 1998). We recommend the inclusion and analysis of 
the philosophies of science, the histories of psychology, and a wide range of 
epistemologies, methodologies, and methods into the psychology curriculum so that 
students graduate with a research repertoire that not only provides them with strong 
research skills across paradigms but equips them with a language that differentiates 
between theory and theoretical framework and between methodology and method. By 
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positioning this knowledge as the foundation to the curriculum students are in a position 
to critically evaluate research (and practice) approaches and therefore acquire essential 
analytical skills in the process. 
Of course a significant barrier to the implementation of the above suggestions is 
the limited number of academic psychologists with the skills and knowledge to actually 
embed the above suggestions into the psychology curricula. In addition to APAC’s 
(2008) Rules for accreditation & Accreditation standards for psychology courses, the 
design, development, and implementation of the psychological curriculum is influenced 
significantly by staff interests and skills (Lipp et al., 2006). Redressing the barrier 
would take time, but could be promoted through strategies such as targeted recruitment, 
team teaching, collaboration between disciplines, mentoring, workshops, and use of 
appropriate texts which would develop the critical mass required for sustained change. 
Professional development in this area is essential not only to ensure the epistemological 
shifts that we call for but also to ensure that the academics training the new generation 
of psychologist do not breach the APS’s (2007) Code of Ethics by teaching a subject (or 
aspects of a subject) that is outside of their area of competence. The recent reviews of 
the training of psychologists (e.g., Littlefield et al., 2007) looks specifically at models of 
training but we argue this remit should be expanded to include the epistemology and 
pedagogy involved in the training of psychology students also.  
The APS can also play an important role in the realisation of epistemological 
and methodological pluralism. The American Psychological Association has a Division 
called the Society for the History of Psychology and the British Psychological Society 
has a History and Philosophy of Psychology Section. We echo Sullivan’s (2008) 
proposal for the establishment of an interest group within the APS devoted to the 
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history and philosophy of psychology. In this way the APS would have an instrumental 
role in providing space and voice to the discussion, debate, and dissemination of the 
philosophical and historical underpinnings of psychology, which in turn would likely 
facilitate the integration of methodological and epistemological pluralism into the 
psychology teaching and research practices within Australian universities9. 
In addition to the suggestions outlined above, we propose a parallel research 
agenda to determine the ways in which psychology in Australia (and elsewhere) might 
move towards embracing methodological and epistemological pluralism. A number of 
questions require further scrutiny – how do graduates from undergraduate and 
postgraduate psychology programmes rate the relevance and utility of their research 
training? Do they really have critical thinking skills? What is the current status of 
various methodologies and epistemologies within psychology? Paralleling research 
conducted in North America (Dawda & Martin, 2001), what are the current inquiry 
beliefs of Australian psychologists? What are the attitudes towards methodological and 
epistemological pluralism within various sectors, including Australian schools and 
departments of psychology, APS, and APAC? What factors are likely to facilitate, and 
what barriers are likely to impede, attempts towards methodological pluralism? How 
might these barriers be overcome? How might the efficacy of such changes be 
measured? The answers to these questions have the potential to facilitate 
methodological and epistemological pluralism within psychology in Australia and 
elsewhere. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to promote an historical understanding of the 
development of psychology, demonstrate its continued adherence to positivism, and 
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highlight the emergence of alternative epistemologies and methodologies. We 
demonstrated how and why positivism has been privileged, discussed the consequences 
of such a restrictive view of psychological science, and presented arguments as to why, 
and how, psychology might move beyond the hegemony of positivism. Within 
psychology, there is a growing dissatisfaction with positivism and its underlying 
assumptions such as objectivity, reality, and universality. The products of positivist 
research, resulting from abstracted, systematic, and rigid methods, do not adequately 
represent or apply to the ‘real world’. Nietzsche (cited in Giroux, 1983) argued that it 
was not science per se but the power of the scientific method over science that was the 
hallmark of the 19th century. Little has changed as we enter the 21st century except that 
psychology is still to fulfil its potential as a science that is relevant to the ‘real world’. 
Alternative epistemologies and methodologies remain predominantly at the margins 
within psychological research, yet these highlight the importance of context, which 
should not be relegated to the background, ‘controlled’ for, or ignored. 
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Notes 
1
 Crotty (1998) distinguishes between the epistemology of objectivism and the 
theoretical perspective of positivism. He does however state that objectivism and 
positivism are similar and linked by the search for universal laws. Indeed, many authors 
use the terms synonymously, and many write of the epistemology of positivism. 
2 This manuscript is by no means an exhaustive account of the history of psychology. 
For a full treatment of the history of the discipline, readers are referred to texts devoted 
to the examination of the history of psychology (e.g., Leahey, 1992). 
3 Although Comte did not coin the term ‘positivism’, he was instrumental in its 
popularisation (Crotty, 1998). 
4 Borrowed from chemistry, a reagent is a constant that produces an invariant reaction 
(Rosnow, 1981). 
5
 Other techniques were utilised such as the double blind experiment, wherein neither 
the researcher nor the participants are aware of which participants are assigned to which 
levels of the independent variable (Martin, 2008). However, the double blind 
experiment does not overcome all experiment effects (Rosnow, 1981). 
6
 Organisational psychology programmes lack sufficient ‘clinical elements’ and thus  
are unable to access the higher funding available to all other speciality psychology  
programmes. 
7
 O’Neill (1989) provides a discussion of the differences between unforeseeable and 
unforseen consequences and their ethical implications. 
8
 While Australian psychology initially took its lead from Britain (Garton, 2006), these 
developments were considered “scattered and insubstantial” (Cooke, 2000, p. 7).  
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9
 It needs to be noted, however, that the APS has long attempted to mitigate, to varying 
success, the tensions created by the often-disparate needs of academics and practitioners 
(Cooke, 2000). The formation of Interests Groups was, in part, to provide a structure for 
discussion and action concerning social issues (Cooke, 2000). While the Interest Groups 
continue to focus on applied areas beyond the academy, there are exceptions, including 
the Teaching, Learning and Psychology Interest Group which was established in 2007. 
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